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In 2002, New Line Productions produced the film John Q. ' about a man
who takes an emergency room hostage when he cannot afford an emergency
heart transplant for his son. While drama of this extent is not common in the
health care field, the basic struggle of the film's protagonist resonates with
many Americans who have felt his frustration with the unavailability of health
care because of financial inhibitors. Furthermore, while most Americans are
fortunate not to be faced with a care-versus-cost dilemma in the context of an
JOHN Q. (New Line Productions, Inc. 2002).
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emergency heart transplant, many face this decision monthly when they try to
fill their prescriptions.
Prescription drugs are an important and necessary part of health care,
but because of cost they are not always available to everyone. People who are
ineligible for Medicaid or Medicare coverage and who cannot afford private
insurance coverage 2 often cannot afford to pay for the medications prescribed by
their doctors. As a result, they are forced to skip doses or just not fill their pre-
scriptions at all.3 Even worse is the fact that in the United States the cost of
prescription drugs is on the rise, making the hope of attaining proper health care
dimmer than ever for these people.4
Focusing on West Virginia, home to one of the oldest 5 and sickest popu-
lations in the United States,6 the problem is particularly disheartening. Along
with Tennessee and Kentucky, West Virginia has the highest level of prescrip-
tions per-capita in the nation.7 Each year the state pays over $500 million for
prescription drugs through state-run health care programs, and West Virginia
2 Prior to the passage of the Medicare Part D program on January 1, 2006, approximately 70
million Americans did not have insurance that covered their prescription drug expenses. BARRY
R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 805 (5th ed. 2004).
3 A 2001 study of Medicare beneficiaries in eight states found that approximately 25% of
seniors without insurance failed to fill at least one prescription because of cost or skipped doses to
make their medications last longer, and 20% cut back their expenses for basic necessities to be
able to afford their prescriptions. DANA SAFRAN ET AL., PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE AND
SENIORS, How WELL ARE STATES CLOSING THE GAPS? 261-63 (2001), available at
www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/2105safran.pdf (type Dana Safran in the "Author" box and
follow link).
4 From 1997 to 2001, the country saw an increase in prescription drug spending of approxi-
mately 11% to 20% each year. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, IMPACT OF DIRECT-
TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING 2 (2003), available at
http'/www.kff.org/rxdrugs/6084-index.cfm (follow "summary of findings" hyperlink); The Asso-
ciated Press, Questions Raised about Proposed Bill: Pharmaceutical Industry Says Health Care
Hurts, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Jan. 26, 2004, at 6D. More specifically, in 2000, prescription
drug spending increased 17.3% from the previous year, and in 2001, expenditures increased again
by 16.4%. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 804 (5th
ed. 2004).
5 West Virginia ranks second, after Florida, for the percent of the total population that are
over the age of 65. U.S. Census Bureau, United States and States: Percentage of People Who are
65 Years and Over, http:/factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GRTrable?_bm=y&-
_box headnbr=-R0103&-dsname=ACS_2004_EST_GOO_&-format=US-30&-CONTEXT=grt
(last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
6 Dan Kurland, Prescription Drugs: West Virginia Leads in Fight Over Fair Drug Pricing,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, July 14, 2004, at 5A.
7 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, RETAIL PRESCRIPTION DRUGS FILLED AT
PHARMACIES (PER CAPITA) (2004), available at http'/www.statehealthfacts.org (follow the "50
State Comparisons" hyperlink, then the "Health Costs & Budgets" hyperlink, and then the "Retail
Rx Drugs Per Capita" hyperlink).
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 109, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol109/iss1/8
A TOUGH PILL TO SWALLOW
residents pay over $1 billion for their prescriptions outside of these government
programs.8
Legislators, skeptics, public watchdogs, and medical professionals
across the country suspect that the rising costs of prescriptions in the United
States can be attributed in part to the excessive amount of money prescription
drug manufacturers dump into advertising and marketing. For example, in
2000, Merck, the makers of Vioxx, spent $160 million on advertising; this is
more than was spent to advertise Budweiser, Pepsi, Nike shoes, or Campbell's
soup. 9 Even more concerning is the fact that in 2000, the top ten pharmaceutical
manufacturers in the United States spent only 14% of their revenue on research
and development ("R&D") but spent 36% on marketing, advertising, and ad-
ministration ("SGA").I0
On the whole, the pharmaceutical industry spends an average of $7 bil-
lion per year advertising prescription drugs in the United States,"l approximately
$4 billion of which is spent on direct-to-consumer advertising1 2 (marketing that
targets patients rather than doctors). 13 In addition to direct-to-consumer adver-
8 Dan Foster, Drug Costs: State has Opportunity to Save Money and Lives, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 2004, at 5A.
9 Don Perdue, Prescription-drug Legislation: West Virginia Must Move Quickly to Pass
Landmark Bill, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 8, 2004, at 5A.
10 Dan Kurland, Prescription Drugs: West Virginia Leads in Fight Over Fair Drug Pricing,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, July 14, 2004, at 5A. But see Uwe E. Reinhardt, Perspectives On the
Pharmaceutical Industry: Granting All Americans Access to Prescription Drugs that Work Should
be a Trivial Economic Challenge for this Wealthy Nation, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS 136, 141 (2001),
available at www.healthaffairs.org (search by author name) (warning that statistics comparing a
company's R&D expenses to its SGA expenses can be misleading because both categories are
broad with fuzzy definitions and because the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
("GAAP"), used to guide companies' reporting to shareholders and the SEC, give companies
leeway in deciding which expenses to assign to each category).
I Josh Hafenbrack, Kiss Weighs Merger, Plan Saves Funds by Uniting Two Teacher Retire-
ment Systems, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Feb. 23, 2004, at 1 A, see also Gzedit, Editorial, Insane
Prescription Costs, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 19, 2006, at 4A (noting that "Americans are just
5 percent of the world's population, yet they provide nearly half of all drug company profits
worldwide, [sic] because U.S. prescription prices are uncapped. Other nations won't tolerate
profiteering, but in America, big-money pharmaceutical lobbyists inveigle politicians to stymie
price controls.").
12 JONATHAN BOMPIANI, A STATE SURVEY ON PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING LEGISLATION 1
(2005), available at httpJ/www.state.wv.us/got/pharmacycouncil/sec/ (follow "Survey of Phar-
maceutical Marketing Legislation" hyperlink under the heading "Documents from July 7, 2005
Meeting").
13 For example, common direct-to-consumer advertising includes pharmaceutical advertise-
ments on TV or in popular magazines other than medical journals read primarily by doctors.
Manufacturers like direct-to-consumer advertising because it works to increase profits. For ex-
ample, it is estimated that in 2000 the companies earned an additional $4.20 in sales for each
dollar they spent on direct-to-consumer advertising. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION,
IMPACT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING 2, 18 (2003),
available at http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/6084-index.cfm (follow "report" hyperlink).
2006]
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tising, pharmaceutical companies across the United States spend approximately
$6 thousand to $7 thousand per doctor every year for marketing. 
14
As a result of this excessive advertising, the prices of drugs are rising to
compensate for the companies' extra expenses.' 5 In response to this problem,
states are developing legislation that aims to control prescription costs. Re-
cently, ten states16 and the District of Columbia 17 passed such legislation. These
states' tactics include, but are not limited to, disclosure requirements for market-
ing expenses, prohibitions on gifts to doctors and pharmacists, licensure re-
quirements, access cards, preferred drug lists, and taxes on marketing ex-
penses. 
18
West Virginia is among the states in the forefront with its Pharmaceuti-
cal Availability and Affordability Act of 2004 ("the Act" or "West Virginia's
law"). 19 As physician and State Senator Dan Foster, commenting on the 2004
Act, put it, "Not only is West Virginia about to make history, we are about to
make a difference in the quality of life for all our people."20 The Pharmaceutical
Availability and Affordability Act provides that the Legislature, "in an effort to
promote healthy communities and to protect the public health and welfare of
West Virginia residents," has a duty to make prescription drugs more affordable
14 KEVIN OUTTERSON, W. VA. PHARMACEUTICAL COST MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, ADVERTISING
AND MARKETING OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 7 (2005), available at
http://www.state.wv.us/got/pharmacycouncil/sec/ (follow "Advertising and Marketing of Prescrip-
tion Drugs" hyperlink under the heading "Documents from September 8, 2005 meeting").
15 See generally THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, IMPACT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
ADVERTISING ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING 1 (2003), available at
http'/www.kff.org/rxdrugs/6084-index.cfm (follow "report" hyperlink) (summarizing a new study
on the contribution of growth in direct-to-consumer advertising to higher prescription drug costs).
16 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 119400 et seq. (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §
2697 et seq. (West 2006); MINN. STAT. § 151.461(l)-(7) (West 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 §
2001 et seq. (West 2006); W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-1 et seq. (West 2006).
17 D.C. CODE § 48-833.01 (West 2006).
18 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 119400 et seq. (West 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
17b-274d (West 2006); D.C. CODE § 48-833.01 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. § 409.9065 (West 2006)
(repealed Jan. 1, 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 2697 et seq. (West 2006); MINN. STAT. §
151.461(1)-(7) (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 414.312 et seq. (West 2006); R.I. PUB. LAwS § 5-
19.1-1 et seq. (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-29E-1 et seq. (West 2006); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 33 § 2001 et seq. (West 2006); W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-1 et seq. (West 2006); see also National
Legislative Association on Prescription Drug Prices, Model Legislation,
http://www.nlarx.org/modelleg/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
19 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-1 et seq. (West 2006).
20 Dan Foster, Drug Costs: State has Opportunity to Save Money and Lives, CHARLESTON
GAzETTE, Dec. 20, 2004, at 5A; see also Scott Finn, A Mouse Roars at the Drug Industry,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Mar. 14, 2004, at 1A (describing West Virginia's law as "bold" and "in-
novative" and quoting Richard Stevens of the West Virginia Pharmacists Association as stating
"The bill puts West Virginia in the lead among states trying to curb prescription drug prices ....
This Legislature has made a bold statement to the drug industry, [sic] that the soaring cost of
prescription drugs must come under control.").
[Vol. 109
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for state residents. 21 To carry out this duty, the legislature created an agency,22
entitled the Pharmaceutical Cost Management Council ("the Council"), to study
and oversee the implementation of the specific provisions of the Act. These
specific provisions include a clearinghouse program, 23 a discount card pro-
gram,2A a pricing schedule,25 and mandatory reporting requirements.
26
Drug manufacturers and distributors are vehemently opposed to certain
aspects of legislation like that proposed in West Virginia. The manufacturers
and distributors, with the help of their primary lobbying organization, the Phar-
maceutical Research and Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA"), have filed
several actions across the country challenging the constitutionality of other
states' legislative attempts to curb the rising cost of prescription drugs. 27 The
21 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-2 (West 2006).
22 Id. § 5A-3C-8.
23 Id. § 5A-3C-4.
24 Id. § 5A-3C-5.
25 Id. § 5A-3C-6.
26 Id. § 5A-3C-13.
27 For example, in 2002 PhRMA challenged a Florida statute, FLA. STAT. §§ 409.91195,
409.912, on preemption grounds in the case PhRMA v. Meadows. 304 F.3d 1197 (11 th Cir. 2002).
The Florida statute provided for prior authorization requirements for prescription drugs produced
by manufacturers that do not agree to pay a rebate to offset the state's Medicaid expenditures. Id.
at 1198-99. Both the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida and the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Florida's law was not preempted by the federal
Medicaid program. Id. at 1212.
Additionally, in 2003, PhRMA challenged a Maine statute, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 2681, in
the case PhRMA v. Walsh on the grounds that it violated the Commerce Clause and that it was
preempted under the Supremacy Clause. 538 U.S. 644 (2003). This statute provided for a pre-
scription pricing program for which the state planned to negotiate with drug manufacturers for
rebates which could then be passed along to state residents purchasing the prescription drugs. Id.
at 654. It further provided that the names of manufacturers that choose not to offer a rebate would
be released to the public and that these manufacturers would be subject to the State Medicaid
program's prior authorization requirements. Id This meant that their drugs could not be dis-
pensed to Medicaid beneficiaries without prior approval by the State Medicaid administrator. In a
very narrow holding, the Court found that PhRMA failed to prove that the Maine law created an
impermissible reach or that it discriminated against interstate commerce in order to subsidize in-
state retail sales. Id. at 699. It further found, in a plurality opinion, that PhRMA failed to over-
come the presumption that the state law was preempted by the Medicaid program. Id. at 661-62.
It did not hold, however, that the state law was in fact valid. Id.
PhRMA raised another challenge in 2005, this time against the District of Columbia in the case
PhRMA v. District of Columbia. 406 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C. 2005). The D.C. law under attack
allowed the government or consumers to sue drug makers if they believed that a drug price was
excessive, meaning 30% higher than the comparable price in Europe, Canada, or Australia. D.C.
CODE § 28-4551 et seq. (2005 Supp.). It placed a burden on the drug company to defend its price
based on research and development costs, profit margin, and other factors or face civil penalties.
Id. PhRMA again sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that this law violated United States
patent law and the Commerce Clause. PhRMA v. D.C., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 64-71. The Court
found the law unconstitutional and granted the injunction on Thursday, December 22, 2005. Id. at
20061
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West Virginia legislation has yet to be challenged in court. Council members
suggest that this is because PhRMA was successful in stripping the most power-
ful provisions from the legislation before its passage.28 However, the Council,
using its only remaining power - rulemaking - has drafted a legislative rule to
make the disclosure requirements of the Act a reality.29 This rule has been pro-
visionally approved by the Council but has yet to be approved by the Legislative
Rule-Making Review Committee.30 Some members of the Council suggest that
once this rule is enacted, it will only be a matter of time before the pharmaceuti-
cal companies initiate a judicial challenge to West Virginia's law.
31
This Article is intended to serve as a roadmap for that litigation, when it
occurs, by providing a constitutional analysis of the Act. The industry likely
will raise several challenges to the Act; however, this Article focuses only on
the potential First Amendment challenges that the industry may raise. This Ar-
ticle concludes that the Act will survive a First Amendment challenge despite
the fact that it discourages pharmaceutical companies from driving up prescrip-
tion drug prices by spending a significant amount of money on advertising cam-
paigns and marketing. A First Amendment challenge has yet to be raised by the
industry in any of the litigation involving other states' statutes because there has
been no opportunity to raise such a challenge against the other states' legisla-
tion. However, West Virginia's law is unique and contains two provisions that
may open the door for the industry to try a new tactic.
This Article argues that West Virginia's law should survive a First
Amendment challenge. First, Part II of this Article introduces the Act, describ-
ing its provisions and how they work to lower the prices of prescription drugs in
the state. Part II includes a summary of the Council's progress in implementing
these provisions since the Act was passed. Part II also identifies the two provi-
sions of the Act which likely will be the subject of the industry's First Amend-
ment challenge and introduces the potential bases for the industry's challenge.
Part 1- describes the two applicable First Amendment standards, the commer-
cial and compelled speech doctrines, upon which the companies will likely rely.
44. The Court held that the law violated the doctrine of interstate commerce and was preempted
by federal patent law. Id. at 44.
28 Interview with Kevin Outterson, West Virginia Pharmaceutical Cost Management Council,
in Morgantown, W. Va. (Jan. 9, 2006).
29 Phil Kabler, Drug Companies Asked to Reveal Spending on Ads, CHARLESTON GAZETrE,
Nov. 11, 2005, at IA.
30 The rule was provisionally approved by the Council on November 10, 2005, but it awaits
approval by the Legislative Rule-Making Review Committee in order to become effective. Phil
Kabler, Drug Companies Asked to Reveal Spending on Ads, CHARLESTON GAZEIrE, Nov. 11,
2005, at IA. Since the Council made its provisional approval in November 2005, it has made
some changes to the disclosure form. The Council is expected to approve the new version in 2007
before it sends its rule to the Review Committee. Lawrence Messina, Leaders Seek Broader Drug
Disclosure Rule, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Sept. 15, 2006, at 6A.
31 Interview with Kevin Outterson, West Virginia Pharmaceutical Cost Management Council,
in Morgantown, W. Va. (Jan. 9, 2006).
[Vol. 109
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Finally, Part 1V analyzes the provisions of the Act under the commercial and
compelled speech doctrines, explaining why the Act likely will survive the in-
dustry's challenge.
II. WV'S Rx: THE PHARMACEUTICAL AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY
ACT OF 2004
To begin, this Section provides an overview of the Act, 32 summarizing
each of its provisions aimed at lowering prescription costs and describing any
significant changes that have occurred since the Act was passed. This Section
then highlights the two sections of the Act which may be subject to a First
Amendment challenge. These sections are the focal point of this Article. Fi-
nally, this Section concludes by providing an overview of the arguments that
may be raised by the pharmaceutical companies.
A. Tablets in the Bottle of the Pharmaceutical Availability and Afforda-
bility Act
The Act was created for the purpose of "promot[ing] healthy communi-
ties and ... protect[ing] the public health and welfare of West Virginia resi-
dents., 33 In order to achieve this purpose, the Legislature found and clearly
stated in the Act that "it is [the Legislature's] responsibility to make every effort
to provide affordable prescription drugs for all residents of West Virginia.
34
The Act, which has yet to be challenged in court, effects this purpose through
several programs and provisions including the creation of a pharmaceutical
council, 5 a clearinghouse program, 36 a discount card program, 37 a pricing
schedule,38 and certain mandatory reporting requirements.39
The most extensive and elaborate provision of the Act creates the Phar-
maceutical Cost Management Council and describes its discretional authority
and mandatory duties. 4° Although the Act does not expressly articulate the pur-
pose of the Council, its purpose - to serve as an administrative agency - can be
inferred from the duties and authorities bestowed upon it. The Council has dis-
cretionary authority to form contracts; file suit; execute purchasing agreements;
consider and develop strategies to manage increasing pharmaceutical costs (such
32 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-I et seq. (West 2006).
33 Id. § 5A-3C-2.
34 Id.
35 Id. § 5A-3C-8.
36 Id. § 5A-3C-4.
37 Id. § 5A-3C-5.
38 Id. § 5A-3C-6.
39 Id. § 5A-3C-13.
40 Id. § 5A-3C-8.
20061
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as mandatory manufacturer disclosure of advertising practices and costs and
counter-detailing programs);4' explore licensing, education requirements, and
fees for drug detailers; investigate the possibility of purchasing drugs from Can-
ada; and promulgate emergency rules.42 The Council has a duty to report to the
legislature on needed legislative action or on any other function established by
the Article or requested by the legislature. 43 It has a duty to study the fiscal im-
pact on the state of the Federal Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and
Modernization Act of 2003. 44 It must develop methods to evaluate the discount
savings and clearinghouse programs created in Sections 5A-3C-4 and 5A-3C-5
of the Act.45 In summary, the Council's ultimate purpose and duty is to use the
provisions of the Act and the programs it creates to carry out the Legislature's
goal of providing affordable prescription drugs to state residents.
In addition to creating the Council, the Act also provides for the crea-
tion of a clearinghouse program.46 The clearinghouse provision requires brand
pharmaceutical manufacturers to use existing private and public sector programs
and prescription drug programs offered by manufacturers to create a new pro-
gram that assists low income and uninsured state residents in accessing prescrip-
tion drugs.47 It also requires the manufacturers to educate individuals and pro-
viders, cover the costs of establishing the program, and oversee the program
until June of 2005.48
PhRMA, the industry's main United States lobbying organization,
launched a clearinghouse program called "RxforWV" in April of 2004, shortly
after the Act was passed.49 "RxforWV" was supposed to increase access to pre-
scription drugs by simplifying the process for locating and applying to the nu-
41 Detailing is the promotion of pharmaceutical drugs by a sales representative employed by a
pharmaceutical manufacturer. Id. § 5A-3C-3(9). This service includes educating healthcare pro-
viders about the pharmaceuticals and providing samples and gifts. Id. The Act does not define
"counter-detailing," but it is generally understood to include the act of making information avail-
able to healthcare providers to counter-balance the marketing of the pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers. It is also called academic detailing. KEVIN OUtrrERSON, W. VA. PHARMACEUTICAL COST
MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, ADVERTISING AND MARKETING OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 11 (2005), avail-
able at httpJ/www.state.wv.us/got/pharmacycouncilsec/ (follow "Advertising and Marketing of
Prescription Drugs" hyperlink under the heading "Documents from September 8, 2005 meeting").
42 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-8(d)(l)-(7) (West 2006).
43 Id. § 5A-3C-8(d)(8).
44 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101 et seq. (West 2006).
45 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-8(d)(10)-(11) (West 2006).
46 Id. § 5A-3C-4.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 PARTNERSHIP FOR PRESCRIPTION ASSISTANCE, HELPING ONE PATIENT AT A TIME: 44,000
WEST VIRGINIANS HELPED, THOUSANDS MORE TO Go: A REPORT ON THE PPA's SUCCESS,
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merous public and private assistance programs already available. 50 Before the
creation of the clearinghouse, residents had to go through an elaborate and time
consuming process to locate and complete forms for each manufacturer's pro-
gram and for each prescription they needed. 51 Each manufacturer's form was
different, asking for different information and proof of eligibility.52 The Clear-
inghouse eased the patient's burden by making all of the program information
available at a single, central location. However, the Clearinghouse did not alle-
viate the resident's obligation to meet each company's eligibility criteria and fill
out each company's form individually. 53 Therefore, even after the creation of
the Clearinghouse, the process remained elaborate and time consuming.
By June of 2005, the date set by the Act to sunset the manufacturers'
supervision of the program, "RxforWV" matched more than 44,000 state resi-
dents with patient assistance programs. 54 However, this number represents the
number of people who were matched with the appropriate paper work, not the
number who actually were approved for assistance. In fact, in a public meeting
of the Council, a representative of PhRMA admitted that there is no evidence
that "RxforWV" has provided a single additional drug to any West Virginia
resident. 55 The month that the program sunset, the state declined to take over
"RxforWV,' 56 and PhRMA terminated the program and rolled it into a national
clearinghouse program called Partnership for Prescription Assistance. 57 West
Virginia residents, along with residents from many other states, can access this
program by logging onto the Partnership's website.' 8
In addition to the clearinghouse program, the Act provides for a pre-
scription discount card program. 59 Under the discount card program, the state
50 Id.
51 WEST VIRGINIA COST MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, CLEARINGHOUSE REPORT 1 (2004), available
at http:/www.state.wv.us/got/pharacycouncil/sec/default.cfm (follow the "Clearinghouse Report"
hyperlink under the heading "Documents from August 25, 2004 Meeting").
52 For example, some companies require copies of applicants' federal income tax returns to
document income, while other companies require copies of pay stubs or Social Security documen-
tation. Id.
53 W. VA. PHARMACEUTICAL COST MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, CLEARINGHOUSE REPORT 2 (2004),
available at http:/www.state.wv.us/got/pharmacycouncil/sec/default.cfm (follow "Clearinghouse
Report (from the Discount Subcommittee) to Pharmaceutical Cost Management Council" hyper-
link under the heading "Documents from August 25, 2004 meeting").
54 PARTNERSHIP FOR PRESCRIPTION ASSISTANCE, HELPING ONE PATIENT AT A TIME: 44,000
WEST VIRGINIANS HELPED, THOUSANDS MORE TO Go: A REPORT ON THE PPA's SUCCESS,
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 1 (2005), available at
http:/www.wvrx.info/UploadedFiles/WVPPAReport.pdf.
55 Interview with Kevin Outterson, West Virginia Pharmaceutical Cost Management Council,
in Morgantown, W. Va. (Jan. 9, 2006).
56 Id.
57 Partnership for Prescription Assistance, https:/www.pparx.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
58 Id.
59 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-5 (West 2006).
2006]
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will negotiate voluntary discounts with brand pharmaceutical manufacturers and
pharmacists, and the discounts will be passed along to eligible residents at the
point of sale when the resident presents a discount card provided by the state.
60
Any uninsured resident who is not currently or has not recently been covered by
a prescription drug program can apply for a discount card. Pharmaceutical
manufacturers who refuse to participate will not be penalized. 6' As of October
2006, however, negotiations between the state and pharmaceutical companies
had not yet begun. 62 Additionally, the prospects of this program do not look
promising. The Council has evaluated several options and has concluded that
the prices paid by PEIA and Medicaid are already cheaper than the cards, that
West Virginia residents already have access to similar cards, and that an addi-
tional card would not help and would only add to the existing confusion.
63
Another provision of the Act asks the council to select a pricing sched-
ule to be used when the state purchases prescription drugs. 64 It requires the
Council to recommend both a pricing schedule based on the Federal Supply
Schedule ("FSS") or the prices set by Canada's Patented Medicine Prices Re-
view Board ("PMPRB") and a strategic plan to implement the schedule for the
purpose of maximizing savings. 65 The FSS price is the price that federal agen-
cies pay for prescription drugs under the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992, 
66
which is set to reflect the prices manufacturers charge their "most-favored,"
non-federal customers under similar terms and conditions.67 In September of
2004, the Council recommended to the state legislators that they adopt the
FSS.68 It also recommended the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme
60 Id.
61 Id. § 5A-3C-5(3)-(4). Unlike the Maine and Florida laws challenged in PhRMA v. Mead-
ows, 304 F.3d 1197 (2000), and PhRMA v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003), which provided that
manufacturers that refuse to participate would be subject to prior authorization requirements and
public disclosure of their refusal to cooperate, the West Virginia legislation expressly states that
failure to participate will not result in prior authorization requirements or the release of a preferred
drug list.
62 Interview with Kevin Outterson, West Virginia Pharmaceutical Cost Management Council,
in Morgantown, W. Va. (Jan. 9, 2006).
63 W. VA. PHARMACEUTICAL COST MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, DISCOUNT SUBCOMMIF EE
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE DISCOUNT CARD 1 (2004), available at
http:/www.state.wv.us/got/pharmacycouncil/sec/default.cfm (follow "Discount Subcommittee
Recommendations on the Discount Card" hyperlink under the heading "Documents from Novem-
ber 18, 2004 meeting"); Interview with Kevin Outterson, West Virginia Pharmaceutical Cost
Management Council, in Morgantown, W. Va. (Oct. 8, 2006).
64 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-6.
65 Id.
66 38 U.S.C. § 1720D (2000).
67 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-3.
68 W. VA. PHARMACEUTICAL COST MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, REFERENCE PRICING REPORT 3
(2004), available at httpJ/www.state.wv.us/got/pharmacycouncil/sec/default.cfm (follow "Refer-
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pricing schedule as a backup.69 One month later, the Senate authorized the use
of the FSS to establish "a benchmark for prescription drug prices for the nego-
tiation and purchase of brand name drugs by the State of West Virginia. 70 As of
October 2006, the Council had not yet used this power.
To encourage innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, the Act gives
the Council discretion to grant waivers from the FSS rate72 to manufacturers on
an individual basis for a particular drug when the "development, production,
distribution costs, other reasonable costs and reasonable profits ... [are] more
than the pricing schedule rate of the pharmaceutical or in those cases in which
the pharmaceutical in question has a sole source., 73 However, the Act excludes
from the waiver all marketing and advertising costs. 74 This means that a manu-
facturer cannot charge prices above those set by the schedule to compensate for
any marketing or advertising expenses but may, if a waiver is granted, raise
prices to compensate for development, production, and distribution. Because
the FSS has not yet been implemented, no waivers have been granted yet."
Finally, the Act delegates to the Council the power to create legislative
rules76 and emergency rules77 to establish mandatory reporting requirements
under which all manufacturers and labelers of prescription drugs must report
69 Id.
70 S. Con. Res. 301, 76th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (W. Va. 2004).
71 Interview with Kevin Outterson, West Virginia Pharmaceutical Cost Management Council,
in Morgantown, W. Va. (Oct. 8, 2006).
72 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-6(h). This section of the West Virginia Code is one of two provi-
sions that the industry is likely to challenge. See infra Parts lI.B., V.A.
73 A "sole source" is a drug that "provides a unique and powerful advantage available in the
market to a broad group of patients established under federal law." W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-3(1 1).
74 Id. § 5A-3C-6(h).
75 Interview with Kevin Outterson, West Virginia Pharmaceutical Cost Management Council,
in Morgantown, W. Va. (Jan. 9, 2006).
76 Following the West Virginia legislative rule-making process, the Agency must first file its
proposed rule with the Secretary of State for publication in the State Register along with a notice
of a public hearing and a request for interested parties to submit evidence on factual determina-
tions and inquires. W. VA. CODE §§ 29A-3-5, 7 (West 2006). After the public hearing, the agency
must approve the rule for submission to the legislature. Id §§ 29A-3-7, -9. The proposed rule
will next be reviewed by the Legislative Rule-Making Review Committee, which will make a
recommendation to the legislature. Id. § 29A-3- 11. Finally, the proposed rule will be considered,
and hopefully approved, by the legislature. Id. § 29A-3-12; see also MICFHES JURISPRUDENCE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 9 (2003).
77 When an agency finds that an emergency exists, it may pass an emergency rule. Emergency
rules are needed "(1) for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, safety or welfare,
(2) to comply with a time limitation established by [the West Virginia Code] or by a federal stat-
ute or regulation, or (3) to prevent substantial harm to the public interest." W. VA. CODE § 29A-3-
15(f). To enact an emergency rule, the agency must file the proposed rule along with a statement
of the circumstances constituting an emergency with the Secretary of State, who will file a notice
in the State Register. Id § 29A-3-15(a). The rule will become effective upon approval by the
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their advertising costs to the Council in order to help the state in its role as a
purchaser of prescription drugs and administrator of prescription drug pro-
grams.78 The state needs this information in order to better understand the scope
of advertising costs and the effect of advertising on the cost and availability of
prescription drugs and healthcare services in West Virginia. The Act orders the
Council to establish reporting requirements for manufacturers through legisla-
tive and emergency rules, including the form, manner, and timeline for report-
ing.79 The Council has some discretion in deciding what information the manu-
facturers and labelers must provide, but the Act provides for some mandatory
disclosures and exemptions as well. 80 The mandatory disclosures include ex-
penses associated with advertising and direct promotion of drugs through radio,
television, magazines, newspapers, direct mail, and phone conversations. 81 The
exemptions include free drug samples intended to be given to patients; payments
to reasonably compensate expenses in connection with bona fide research stud-
ies designed to answer questions about vaccines, new therapies, and new uses of
known treatments; and scholarships for medical students, fellows, and residents
selected by professional associations to attend conferences.82
On November 10, 2005, the Council provisionally approved a financial
disclosure form to satisfy this section of the Act. 83 This form asked pharmaceu-
tical companies to report information including aggregate expenditures associ-
ated with drug sales representatives who worked in West Virginia (such as sala-
ries, benefits, support staff, marketing program expenses, outside contractors,
and expense accounts); gifts, grants, and payments made to West Virginia pre-
scribers, patient support groups, and patient advocacy groups; promotional and
informational programs for West Virginia pharmacies; and direct-to-consumer
advertising that was intended to reach West Virginia residents. 84 In July 2006,
the Council voted to omit a requirement for disclosure of the amount spent on
marketing to physicians.85 As of October 2006, the Council was still debating
its authority to include such a provision but expected to draft a fimal version of
the disclosure form in 2007 that would include the disclosure for marketing to
78 W. VA. CODE. § 5A-3C-13. This section of the West Virginia Code is the second provision
the industry likely will challenge. See Infra Parts H.B., IV.B.
79 Id. § 5A-3C-13(b).
80 Id. §§ 5A-3C-13(b)-(c).
81 Id. § 5A-3C-13(b).
82 Id. § 5A-3C-13(c)(1)-(3).
83 Phil Kabler, Editorial, Drug Companies Asked to Reveal Spending on Ads, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Nov. 11, 2005, at IA.
84 West Virginia Cost Management Council, http:/www.state.wv.us/got/pharmacycouncil
(find Appendix H and follow "Proposed Reporting Form" hyperlink) (last visited Oct., 20, 2006).
85 Lawrence Messina, Leaders Seek Broader Drug Disclosure Rule, CHARLESTON DAILY
MAIL, Sept. 15, 2006, at 6A.
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physicians.86 Once the final version is approved by the Council, the Council's
next step will be to send its proposal to the Legislative Rule-Making Review
Committee for review and recommendations and then to the Legislature for ap-
proval.87
B. The Industry's Allergic Reaction to WV's Rx: An Overview of the Prob-
lematic Sections in the Act and the Industry's Probable Response
Two of the provisions of the Act and the accompanying regulation
promulgated by the Council, namely the pricing schedule 88 and the disclosure
requirement, 89 are likely to be challenged by the companies as a violation of the
First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. 90 The companies likely will argue
that these sections and the regulation discourage or restrict their ability to adver-
tise their products.
First, the pharmaceutical companies may challenge Section 5A-3C-6 of
the Act. This section provides for the implementation of a pricing schedule and
prohibits pharmaceutical companies from receiving a waiver when the increased
costs of distribution are attributable to advertising and marketing expenses. 9'
This section permits the Council to grant a waiver if the development, produc-
tion, and distribution costs total more than the pricing schedule rate, but it ex-
pressly exempts advertising costs from the equation.92 The pharmaceutical
companies may see this as a restriction on their ability to advertise because it
limits the amount of money that they can charge for a drug and therefore the
amount that they can collect from sales to pay for their advertising campaigns.93
Companies may feel discouraged from marketing their products, knowing that
their revenues will be limited by the pricing schedule and that they will no
longer be able to pass their marketing expenses onto consumers. They may
even view it as a penalty for advertising. Because, from the industry's point of
view, this amounts to a restriction on their ability to advertise, the potential
plaintiffs likely will rely on the commercial speech doctrine if they litigate this
section of the Act.
86 Id.; Interview with Kevin Outterson, West Virginia Pharmaceutical Cost Management
Council, in Morgantown, W. Va. (Oct. 8, 2006).
87 W. VA. CODE §§ 29A-3-11, -12.
88 Id. § 5A-3C-6.
89 Id. § 5A-3C-13.
90 The companies likely will bring more than just a First Amendment-based attack; they may
also challenge the Act on Commerce Clause and Preemption grounds as they have challenged the
legislation of other states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. However, these
other attacks are beyond the scope of this Article.
91 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-6(h).
92 Id.
93 See infra Part IV.A.
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The commercial speech doctrine protects communication made for the
sole purpose of selling products or services. 94 While commercial speech does
not receive the strongest degree of protection that the First Amendment can
give,95 it does receive a heightened level of scrutiny.96 In order for the Act to
survive this heightened level of scrutiny, the Government will have to prove that
the Act directly advances a substantial governmental interest and that it is no
broader than necessary. 97 If the court applies this test, the Act likely will sur-
vive because although the state has several less restrictive alternatives available,
such as the clearinghouse 98 and discount card programs,99 these programs are
insufficient to satisfy the State's goals. Furthermore, the court may not even
need to go as far as applying the intermediate standard; the state has a strong
argument that the First Amendment does not even apply here because this is not
really a restriction on speech but rather it is the state's exercise of its spending
power.1l°
Second, the pharmaceutical companies may challenge Section 5A-3C-
13 and the Council's proposed legislative rule as restrictions on their freedom of
speech.1'1 Section 5A-3C-13 mandates reporting by pharmaceutical companies
of their advertising expenses. The proposed legislative rule provides for the
actual disclosure requirements as promulgated by the Council.'°2 The Act pro-
tects the information collected by the Council as confidential but permits the
Council to release the companies' data in aggregate form.' 03
The pharmaceutical companies may view this as a restriction on their
freedom of speech because the information, even if released in aggregate form,
may create bad publicity that discourages the public from buying brand pharma-
ceuticals. The companies may feel compelled to advertise less in order to pro-
vide better-sounding statistics to the Council and thereby avoid the inevitable
public censure on the industry. In the interest of avoiding this criticism and
maintaining the confidentiality of this information, the companies may chal-
94 Gail H. Javitt, Erica Stanley & Kathy Hudson, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests, Govern-
ment Oversight, and the First Amendment: What the Government Can (and Can't) Do to Protect
the Public's Health, 57 OKLA. L. REv. 251, 254 (2004).
95 That is generally reserved for situations in which the Government forbids a citizen from
stating his or her beliefs or opinions, or in other words, when the government regulates the content
of speech. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, NIMMER AND SMOLLA ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:62 (1998).
96 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
97 Id.; see infra Part M A.
98 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-4.
99 Id. § 5A-3C-5.
100 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199 (1991) (holding that the Government may use its spend-
ing power selectively by choosing to fund one program instead of another and that this choice
does not violate the First Amendment).
101 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-1 3; W. Va. Cost Management Council, supra note 84.
102 West Virginia Cost Management Council, supra note 84.
103 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-1 3(e).
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lenge these provisions under the First Amendment compelled speech doctrine -
a doctrine that protects the right to remain silent - on the grounds that the gov-
ernment is essentially requiring the companies to release information to the pub-
lic that the companies do not want to release.'4 The companies likely will ar-
gue that the release of this information unduly discourages them from advertis-
ing, which regardless of its effect on the price of pharmaceuticals, is a protected
activity.
Under the compelled speech doctrine, courts have applied either inter-
mediate or strict scrutiny depending upon whether the disclosure requirement
was content-based or content-neutral. 0 5 For the Act to survive strict scrutiny,
the Government must prove that the Act is narrowly tailored to further a com-
pelling governmental interest1 °6 If the court applies intermediate scrutiny, the
Government will only have to show that the Act is no broader than necessary
and that it furthers an important governmental interest. 1 7 Even if the court puts
the Act to the strictest scrutiny, the Act likely will survive because it furthers the
state's interest in protecting public health10 8 and because government disclosure
requirements have previously been found to be narrowly tailored restrictions.'19
ImI. APPLICABLE FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARDS: VITAMIN C OR A SOURCE OF
STRESS ON THE STATE'S IMMUNE SYSTEM?
As the preceding Section discussed, the pharmaceutical companies may
contest two sections of the Pharmaceutical Affordability and Availability Act.
This Section explores the legal framework upon which the companies may base
their challenge.
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."' 10 These freedoms are valu-
able because they encourage the free flow of information, which promotes per-
104 See infra Part IH.B.; see generally David W. Ogden, Is There a First Amendment "Right to
Remain Silent"?, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 368 (1993).
105 Daniel A. Klein, Federal Constitution's First Amendment Guarantee of Freedom of Speech
and Press as Protecting Private Right to Refuse to Foster, Repeat, Advertise or Disseminate View,
Message or Statement Divergent from One's Own, 132 L. ED. 2D 961, § 2[a] (1999).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995) (stating that "States have a
compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and... as part of their
power to protect public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to establish
standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.").
109 Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988).
110 U.S. CONST. amend. I. This right is extended to states by the Fourteenth Amendment, so
state governments, like Congress, must also be mindful of the freedoms of speech and press. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV; see, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (extend-
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sonal self-fulfillment, leads to the attainment of truth through the exchange of
ideas, fosters societal participation in social and political decision-making, and
strikes a balance between stability and change in society.' The First Amend-
ment creates a fundamental right, and therefore, any restrictions on the content
of speech are subject to strict scrutiny to ensure broad protection." 2 This is the
court's most restrictive standard. In contrast, the court applies intermediate
scrutiny, a slightly lower level of scrutiny, to content-neutral restrictions.
113
Both of these standards will be discussed in more detail below. 114
Traditionally, the First Amendment has been used to protect the ex-
change of ideas and political, social, scientific, or artistic expression. 115 How-
ever, since the 1970s it has been extended to commercial speech - communica-
tion for the sole purpose of selling products or services." 6 The Supreme Court
of the United States has stated that the mere fact that a speaker's only interest in
speaking is a purely economic interest is not enough to deny that speaker of the
First Amendment's protection. 117 The commercial speech doctrine will be dis-
cussed below in Subsection A.
Additionally, the First Amendment has been used to protect the right to
refrain from speaking. 118 The First Amendment compelled speech doctrine pre-
vents the government from requiring citizens to profess beliefs which they do
not wish to profess publicly - or perhaps beliefs which they do not even hold -
and from requiring citizens to make disclosures that impermissibly discourage
speech." 9 The compelled speech doctrine will be discussed below in Subsec-
tion B.
II Javitt et al., supra note 94, at 287 (citing Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963)).
112 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, NIMMER AND SMOLLA ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:12 (2003) (citing
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)).
13 Id.
114 See infra pp. 19-28.
115 Javitt et al., supra note 94, at 254.
116 Id.; Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
117 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 365 (2002); Va. State Bd of Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 762.
118 See Ogden, supra note 104.
119 Id. (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Brown v. Socialist
Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1974); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958);
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
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A. The First Amendment Standard for Commercial Speech
The First Amendment proscribes the government from prohibiting
speech based on its content. 20 In other words, the Government cannot forbid
speech simply because it disagrees with or disapproves of the message con-
veyed. There are, however, several exceptions to this general rule. Four catego-
ries of speech are excluded from First Amendment protection by definition: (1)
obscenity, (2) fighting words, (3) incitement, and (4) defamation. 121 These cate-
gories of speech are excluded because they have low social value, because they
do not contribute to the exchange of ideas and the search for truth, and because
the social interests in order and morality outweigh any benefit that they pro-
duce. 22 Commercial speech was once excluded for similar reasons, but as of
the 1970s it became a protected classification of speech.
23
In 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council that commercial
speech, or speech that does nothing more than propose a commercial transac-
tion, is protected by the First Amendment. 124 In this case, consumers challenged
the constitutionality of a Virginia law 25 that forbade licensed pharmacists from
advertising the prices of prescription drugs. The court found the law invalid
because it was a complete ban on commercial speech, which the court found
was not "so removed from any 'exposition of ideas' and from 'truth, science,
morality, and arts, that it lacks all protection."' 26 In coming to this conclusion,
the court considered the interests of the pharmacists in their business, the inter-
ests of the consumers in obtaining information that could mean the difference
between being able to afford a prescription or not, and the interests of society in
general in obtaining information necessary to make intelligent and informed
decisions. 27 In responding to the Board's fears that permitting advertising
would precipitate a race to the bottom, damage the professional image of the
pharmacist, and destroy the personal relationships between customers and their
120 Javitt et al., supra note 94, at 287 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988)). How-
ever, it does not prevent the government from making some restrictions as to the time, place, and
manner of the speech, as long as the restriction is justified without regard to the content, the re-
striction is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and there are other open
channels for expression. Id at 287 (citing Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 228, 293 (1984)).
121 Id. at 288 (citing RUSSELL L. WEAVER & ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 89, 106, 435 (2002)). Other forms of speech are also not pro-
tected such as perjury, criminal solicitation, and attempted bribery.
122 Id. at 289 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
123 Id.
124 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
125 VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974) (Repealed by Acts 1988, ch. 765).
126 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762.
127 Id. at 762-65.
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pharmacists, the court noted that a complete ban on advertising is a paternalistic
approach and that it does not directly affect the standards of professionalism.' 28
The Supreme Court further clarified its standard for commercial speech
in its opinion in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York. 129 In this case, the court invalidated a state ban on
advertising by electric companies. 130 The court articulated a four-prong test to
determine the validity of restrictions on commercial speech. 131 Under this test,
the court considers (1) whether the speech is false or misleading or fosters ille-
gal activity, (2) whether the state has a substantial interest in restricting the
speech, (3) whether the restriction directly advances the state's interest, and (4)
whether the restriction is no broader than necessary to satisfy the state's inter-
est.1
32
Applying this standard to the ban on electric company advertising, the
court found that the State failed to meet two of the four prongs of the test.
133
Considering the first prong, the court found that the Government did not argue
that the ads were inaccurate or used to promote unlawful activity. 134 Therefore,
the first prong was not at issue. Second, the court found that the Government
had substantial interests in both conserving energy and preventing energy rates
from inflating. 35 Third, the court considered the link between the advertising
ban and the state's interest in controlling costs. 3 6 The court found that this link
was at best speculative and tenuous and therefore failed the third prong.
37
However, it found that the link between the prohibition on advertising and the
interest in conserving energy was direct because the ads were intended - and
likely to - increase the company's sales. 138 Finally, the court considered the
fourth prong of the test - whether the restriction was no broader than neces-
sary. 139 The court found that the regulation banned all marketing by electric
companies regardless of whether the marketed service or device caused an up-
ward pressure on energy consumption.140 Thus, the ban failed the fourth prong
of the test because it was overly broad and not narrowly tailored.
128 Id. at 769-70.
129 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
130 Id. at 558-560.
131 Id. at 564.
132 Id. at 564.
133 Id. at 569-71.
134 Id. at 566.
135 Id. at 568-69.
136 Id. at 569.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 569-70.
14" Id. at 570.
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Many of the recent cases following Central Hudson141 turn on the third
and fourth prongs of the analysis 42 because in recent years, the court has begun
to impose a higher burden on the Government with respect to these two
prongs. 143 Under the third prong, a restriction must directly advance the state
interest to be valid, or in other words, it must be an effective way of achieving
the state's ends. 144 For example, consider the analysis in Edenfleld v. Fane,
which turned on the third prong of the test. 145 In Edenfield, the State of Florida
had passed a ban on "direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation" by a CPA of peo-
ple or entities not already clients. 146 The court found this statute invalid because
it failed the third prong of the Central Hudson test.147 The State put forth two
interests in restricting this form of advertising: (1) protecting consumers from
fraud and (2) maintaining actual CPA independence and the appearance of that
independence in auditing, both of which the court found to be substantial inter-
ests. 148 However, the court found that the State failed to put forth any evidence
that showed that its regulation directly advanced these interests.' 49 In fact, the
court found that the State actually put forth evidence which tended to contradict
rather than support its arguments. 150 Thus, the court found the statute invalid
because the State failed to meet its burden with respect to the third prong. 151
Cases also frequently turn on the fourth prong, which asks whether the
restriction is too broad. 152 In order to survive the fourth prong of the commer-
cial speech test, a restriction must be narrowly drawn. 153 A restriction is nar-
rowly drawn if it regulates only speech that poses a threat to the state's inter-
est. 154 This does not mean that the restriction must be the least restrictive means
141 Id. The stability of the Central Hudson test is uncertain. In recent commercial speech
cases, several Supreme Court Justices have noted that they would like to revisit the standard when
the right fact set is raised. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 489 (1996).
142 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (finding that laws prohibit-
ing advertisements of tobacco products near schools and playgrounds violated the First Amend-
ment because they were overly broad); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (finding that a ban
on in-person solicitation by CPA's violated the First Amendment because it did not serve the
state's substantial interests).
143 See also Javitt et al., supra note 94, at 292-94.
144 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-65.
145 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
146 Id. at 764 (quoting FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 21A-24.002(2)(c) (1992)).
147 Id. at 763, 770-73.
148 Id. at 768-70.
149 Id. at 771-73.
150 Id. at 772.
151 Id. at 763.
152 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
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available. 155 Rather, the court will look for a reasonable "fit" between the
means and the end of the regulation. 156 The government must prove that it has
"carefully calculated" the burdens imposed by the requirement and that those
burdens are justified in light of the weight of the state's interest.' 57 Parties op-
posing the government restriction on speech, however, may prevail on this fac-
tor if they can show that there are "numerous and obvious less-burdensome al-
ternatives" available. 158
For an example of a prong-four analysis, consider Thompson v. Western
States Medical Center, in which the court's decision turned on the breadth of a
federal restriction. 159 In this case, the court considered a federal statute 16° that
permitted pharmacists, pharmacies, and physicians to advertise compounding
services but forbade them from advertising the specific compounded drugs. 
161
The court applied the Central Hudson test and found the statute unconstitutional
because it was not narrowly tailored. 162 Clarifying its reasoning as to the fourth
prong, the court explained that if the government can find a means that does not
restrict speech or that restricts less speech, it must do so. 163 The court stated, "If
the First Amendment means anything, it means that regulating speech must be a
last - not first - resort."'164 The court supported its conclusion by listing several
less-restrictive alternatives that the government could have used to achieve its
goal of preventing large-scale manufacturing of the compounded drugs.
165
The Central Hudson test is currently the fundamental test for evaluating
restrictions on commercial speech. Thus, the four-prong approach of this test
will be the framework for evaluating § 5A-3C-6 of the Pharmaceutical Avail-
ability and Affordability Act, the section that provides for the implementation of
the pricing schedule and offers waivers for innovation but not marketing ex-
penses.
155 Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
156 Id. at 470.
157 Id. at 480; compare 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (finding that
the state failed the fourth prong because there were several alternatives that would be more effec-
tive and would not regulate any speech), with Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478
U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding a state regulation because the legislature made a reasonable choice
regarding the best way to achieve its interest).
158 Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 418, n.13 (1993).
159 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
160 21 U.S.C. § 353a(a) (2000).
161 Thompson, 535 U.S. at 364-65.
162 Id. at 371.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 373.
165 Id. at 372.
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B. The First Amendment Standard for Compelled Speech
In addition to a challenge based on the commercial speech doctrine, the
pharmaceutical companies likely will advance an argument that the Act compels
speech in violation of the First Amendment compelled speech doctrine. The
First Amendment not only protects people from governmental restrictions on
speech, but it also protects their right to choose not to speak at all. 166 Generally,
this freedom is thought to protect a person from being forced to profess beliefs -
political, religious, or other - against his or her will; 67 however, the state and
federal governments can neither compel the expression of opinions nor require a
factual disclosure that impermissibly burdens or discourages speech. 68 On the
subject of the difference between compelled speech and compelled silence - the
traditional First Amendment protection - the Supreme Court of the United
States has stated, "There is certainly some difference . . . but in the context of
protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for the
First Amendment guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term necessarily compris-
ing the decision of both what to say and what not to say."
' 169
The court has articulated two policy theories that support the freedom
from compelled speech - one based on the freedom of consciousness or belief
and the other based on the theory that compelled speech may discourage a
speaker from expressing his or her own views. 170 In recognizing these two un-
derlying theories, however, the court has made it clear that both compelled
statements of opinion and compelled statements of fact can burden protected
speech and constitute a violation of the First Amendment. 7 1  The Supreme
Court has also extended the doctrine to compelled commercial speech. 172 In the
166 Ogden, supra note 104.
167 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1994); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
168 Ogden, supra note 104 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 375 U.S. 1 (1986);
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
169 Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-797 (1988). But see
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650-51
(1985) (noting that the difference between disclosure requirements and prohibitions on speech are
material).
170 Javitt et al., supra note 94, at 295 (citing Mclntyer v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334
(1995); Wooley v. Maynard, 340 U.S. 705 (1977); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Lawrence 0. Gostin & Gail H. Javitt,
Health Promotion and the First Amendment: Government Control of the Informational Environ-
ment, 79 MILBANKQ. 547, 560 (2001)).
171 Riley, 487 U.S. at 797-98.
172 Javitt et al., supra note 94, at 295 (citing United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405,
413-16 (2001)); but see Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (holding that the
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commercial speech context, compelled speech cases usually involve government
requirements that certain information be disclosed on a label 173 or requirements
that an industry subsidize advertisements. 174
The court has relied on two different standards in analyzing compelled
speech cases: strict scrutiny and intermediate review. 75 Generally, the court
will apply strict scrutiny when a person is compelled to make a statement of
belief or fact against his or her will and the requirement is content-based.
176
Under strict scrutiny, the government must prove that its regulation is narrowly
tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. 177 When a court applies
strict scrutiny, it presumes that the law is invalid and in most instances will
strike it down. 178 However, where the government compels speech in a manner
that is content-neutral and imposes only an incidental burden on speech, the
court will apply intermediate review. 79 Under intermediate review, the gov-
ernment must prove that its regulation is no broader than necessary and that it
furthers an important governmental interest. 180 A regulation is content-neutral,
and thus subject to intermediate review, if it is passed for reasons unrelated to
the content of the speech.'18  Generally, though not necessarily, content-neutral
laws regulate the time, place, or manner of speech.
82
The essential First Amendment case involving compelled disclosure of
facts is Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.183 In
this case, the court considered a North Carolina law' 84 that in part required pro-
fessional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors the gross percentage of
173 See, e.g., Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996) (granting an in-
junction against the enforcement of a statute that required disclosure on dairy product labels if the
product was created with the use of bovine growth hormones).
174 See, e.g., United States v. United Foods Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (invalidating a federal
statute requiring mushroom farmers to subsidize generic advertising for the industry because the
statute coerced speech); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 384 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that it was acceptable for the government to tax tobacco companies and use the tax dol-
lars to criticize the tobacco industry).
175 Klein, supra note 105, § 2[a].
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
179 Klein, supra note 105, at § 2[a].
18o Id.
181 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, NIMMER AND SMOLLA ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:66 (2005).
182 Id.
183 487 U.S. 781 (1988). Riley is part of a line of cases dealing with charitable solicitations that
recognize that speech is particularly critical to grass roots organizations and advocacy groups.
The other cases in this line, however, deal with regulations that limit speech rather than compel it.
See, e.g., Sec'y of State of Md. v. Munson, 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens
for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of
Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
184 N.C. GEN. STAT. §131C-16.1 (1986).
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revenues actually turned over to the charities within the past twelve months.
The court held that this law violated the fundraisers' First Amendment rights.
85
Although the court recognized that the solicitation involved commercial
speech, it applied strict scrutiny rather than the intermediate standard tradition-
ally applied to commercial speech because, in the case of charitable solicita-
tions, the commercial speech was "inextricably intertwined" with fully protected
speech. 86 The court found that strict scrutiny was the proper standard because
the statute was a content-based regulation because "[m]andating speech that a
speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of speech."'
8 7
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a law, to be upheld, must be justified by a
"compelling" governmental interest and narrowly tailored to effectuate that in-
terest.
88
Applying this standard, the court in Riley found that the law was invalid
because (1) the state's interest was not compelling and (2) the law was unduly
burdensome and not narrowly tailored because other less restrictive options
were available to the state. 89 In its discussion of this second factor, the court
offered as an example of a less restrictive option the state's ability to publish the
financial disclosure forms of each of the professional fundraisers. 190
The opinion in Riley has been criticized as being overly broad in its ap-
plication of strict scrutiny to protect people from the threat of compelled
speech.' 9' In particular, the court's statement that compelling speech necessar-
ily alters the speech's content has received much criticism. 9 2 Attorney David
W. Ogden, a First Amendment scholar, has noted that the court's opinion in
Riley casts a shadow of doubt on numerous contexts in which the government
compels speech, including disclosures in federal and state tax returns, disclo-
sures by employers about wages paid and funds withheld, financial disclosures
by securities issuers, and disclosures by pharmaceutical companies of drugs'
side effects, among others. 93 Ogden and other critics suggest that disclosure
requirements and other forms of government-compelled speech should not be
protected to the same extent as compelled silence.' 94 Compelled speech, they
argue, is in line with the principles that underlie First Amendment freedoms,
185 Riley, 487 U.S. at 784.
186 Id. at 796.
187 Id. at 795.
188 See, e.g., Sable Commc'n v. F.C.C., 429 U.S. 115 (1989).
189 487 U.S. at 798-801.
190 Id. at 800.
191 See generally Ogden, supra note 104.
192 See id.
193 See id.
194 See, e.g., Caren Schmulen Sweetland, The Demise of a Workable Commercial Speech Doc-
trine: Dangers of Extending First Amendment Protection to Commercial Disclosure Require-
ments, 76 TEx. L. REv. 471 (1997).
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including "truth-seeking" and the "market place of ideas. 195 Unlike compelled
silence, disclosures increase the flow of valuable information to consumers.
196
Despite this negative treatment by commentators, Riley is still controlling law
and must be applied in an analysis under the First Amendment doctrine for com-
pelled speech.
IV. BAD MEDICINE OR THE PERFECT RX: AN ANALYSIS OF WV's LEGISLATION
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The previous Section and its two Subsections laid the foundation upon
which a challenge must be mounted. This Section of the Article builds upon
that foundation by applying each of the First Amendment doctrines described
above to the two sections of the West Virginia Pharmaceutical Availability and
Affordability Act that will likely be challenged by the companies. Subsection A
addresses the pricing schedule waiver-restriction and applies the Central Hud-
son test for commercial speech, concluding that this section of the Act is likely
to survive the Central Hudson intermediate level of scrutiny. Additionally, it
offers, as an alternative, an argument that the First Amendment does not even
apply to this provision because it does not restrict speech. Because the State
could win under either of these arguments, Subsection A concludes that the pric-
ing schedule likely will survive a First Amendment challenge. Subsection B
analyzes the Act's disclosure requirements under the First Amendment doctrine
for compelled speech and applies strict scrutiny. It concludes that this section of
the Act will also survive First Amendment scrutiny, regardless of whether the
court applies strict or intermediate scrutiny.
A. The Pricing Schedule and Waivers
Section 5A-3C-6 of the Act provides that the Council shall establish a
pricing schedule for pharmaceutical drugs in order to maximize savings for peo-
ple in the state. 197 It further provides that the manufacturers can request waivers
from the pricing schedule for drugs whose "development, production, distribu-
tion costs, and other reasonable costs" - but not marketing and advertising costs
- are greater than the pricing schedule rate. 198 Because the statute expressly
denies a waiver for marketing costs, pharmaceutical companies may view this
section as an inhibition on their ability to advertise. In other words, they may
view it as a penalty for their speech because, in effect, it limits their ability to
charge a price that reflects their actual expenses, which would include advertis-
ing. Thus, the pharmaceutical companies may argue that the Central Hudson
commercial speech analysis must be applied.
195 See Ogden, supra note 104, at 369.
196 Id. at 370.
197 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-6(d) (West 2006).
198 Id. § 5A-3C-6(h).
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In opposition, the State may argue that the First Amendment does not
apply to this section. It may argue that the statute does nothing more than pro-
vide a subsidy for development while denying reimbursement for marketing
expenses.199 In other words, it permits the government to subsidize develop-
ment expenses in order to encourage innovation, which is something that the
State is not required to do. As West Virginia Pharmaceutical Cost Management
Council member Kevin Outterson has analogized, the IRS is not required to give
a deduction for advertising, and the public purse does not have to support
speech by giving a tax deduction for political contributions. 2°°
Although the State may not unduly restrict speech, it is not required by
the First Amendment to subsidize companies' advertisements. 20 1 For example,
in Rust v. Sullivan the Supreme Court of the United States considered a regula-
tion that restricted the use of funds granted under Title X of the Public Health
Service Act2°2 to "preventive" family planning services. 2°3 The regulation for-
bade the use of funds for services related to abortions.2 °4 Faced with a First
Amendment challenge alleging that the regulation imposed viewpoint discrimi-
nation, the court held that the Act was constitutional.20 5 The court reasoned that
the Government may use its spending power selectively by choosing to fund one
program instead of another.206 The Government's mere refusal to "subsidize the
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right." 207
Here, West Virginia has acted much like the Federal Government in
Rust. It has chosen to subsidize some forms of activity relating to the manufac-
ture and distribution of pharmaceuticals, namely development, production, and
distribution. At the same time, it has chosen not to fund other related activities
such as advertising. As in Rust, West Virginia has merely subsidized one activ-
ity to the exclusion of another. 20 8 This is a choice which the Government is
permitted to make and which does not constitute an infringement of the pharma-
ceutical companies' First Amendment rights.2°9
199 Id.
200 Interview with Kevin Outterson, West Virginia Pharmaceutical Cost Management Council,
in Morgantown, W Va. (Jan. 9, 2006).
201 United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 212 (2003) (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 194 (1991)) (stating that "[A] legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a
fundamental right does not infringe the right.").
202 42 U.S.C. § 300 et seq. (West 2006).
203 Rust, 500 U.S. at 179.
204 Id. at 179-81.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 193.
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The companies may rebut, relying on a case in which the Supreme
Court of the United States found that a monetary restriction amounted to a pen-
alty on speech. The companies may argue that the waiver restriction acts like a
penalty. For example, in Speiser v. Randall the court considered a tax asses-
sor's denial of property tax exemptions to all people who refused to sign an oath
stating that they did not advocate the overthrow of the Government. 210 The
court held that this restriction violated the First Amendment because it denied a
tax exemption to people who engaged in certain forms of speech and thereby
effectively penalized them for speaking.
211
However, West Virginia's restriction is distinguishable from the restric-
tion in Speiser. In Speiser, the Plaintiffs were World War II veterans who had
received and relied upon the tax exemptions for years and who were suddenly
denied the exemption when the Government revised the statute and added the
oath.21 2 Here, however, the whole pricing schedule is something new, and thus
the waiver-restrictions are not a change from a past practice under ,:.h the
state subsidized advertising. Because West Virginia is not taking away a sub-
sidy that the pharmaceutical companies had come to rely on, the restrictions
should not be viewed as a penalty.
The State's spending clause-based argument should be the winning ar-
gument in this case, and the analysis of the pricing schedule and waiver-
restriction should stop here. However, even if the court determines that the
waiver-restriction acts like a penalty, the Act may nonetheless survive under
Central Hudson's intermediate scrutiny standard.
Under the Central Hudson test, the court will first consider whether the
regulation targets speech that is false or misleading or that fosters illegal activ-
ity. 2 3 Section 5A-3C-6 does not do any of this; therefore, it regulates protected
speech and the court must continue with the rest of the test. This prong likely
will not be disputed by either party in litigation.
Section 5A-3C-6 may also survive the second prong, under which the
court considers whether the State has a substantial interest in restricting the
speech.214 The government's interest, as stated at the beginning of the Act, is in
controlling and lowering the cost of prescription drugs in the state to make them
more affordable to residents.21 5 Stated more broadly, the State has an interest in
the public health and welfare of its residents.216 By making prescription drugs
less expensive by controlling prices with a pricing schedule, the State hopes to
210 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 515 (1958).
211 Id. at 518.
212 Id. at 514-515.
213 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563-564
(1980).
214 Id. at 564.
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make prescription drugs more available and to "maximize savings to the broad-
est percentage of the population of [the] state., 217 It would be difficult to argue
that the health of citizens is not a substantial governmental interest.2 8 In fact,
the Supreme Court of the United States has stated several times that states have
a substantial interest in public health and welfare. 219 Thus, § 5A-3C-6 likely
will also pass the second prong of the Central Hudson test.
Under the third prong, the court considers whether the restriction di-
rectly advances the State's interest or, in other words, whether the restriction is
an effective way of achieving the State's ends. 220 Here the waiver restriction
advances the state's goal of lowering prescription drug costs because it limits
the types of expenses for which the Council can waive the pricing schedule. By
placing this restriction on the Council, the Act limits the number of times that
the Council will be able to waive the pricing schedule and the dollar amount for
which the Council will be able to waive it. Therefore, more companies will be
subject to the price controls, and the overall cost of prescription drugs will de-
crease. The companies will be hard-pressed to argue that the waiver restriction
will not directly affect the cost of pharmaceuticals in the West Virginia.
However, the State will have to put up a stronger fight to survive the
fourth prong. Under the fourth prong, the court considers whether the restric-
tion is no broader than necessary,221 or in other words, whether the law is nar-
rowly tailored, whether there are no less restrictive means available, or whether
the law regulates speech that poses no threat to the State's interest. 222 This
prong may provide the companies with their best opportunity to convince the
court to invalidate § 5A-3C-6 under the commercial speech doctrine.
The companies may argue that the West Virginia law is too broad be-
cause it is an overarching restriction on all companies' ability to advertise and
because it discourages even advertising by companies who have smaller budgets
for marketing. The companies may compare this restriction to the law in Cen-
tral Hudson, which banned all advertising by electric companies in order to con-
trol energy consumption.223 The companies may argue that like the law in Cen-
217 Id. § 5A-3C-6(d).
218 See generally Kevin Outterson, Health Care, Technology, and Federalism, 103 W. VA. L.
REV. 503 (2001) (discussing state health regulations and the recent growth in federal regulation of
heath care).
219 See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 369 (2002) (finding the state's
interest in "preserving the effectiveness and integrity of the FDCA's new drug approval process"
and the protection of the public health that it provides to be a substantial interest); Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) (stating "the Government here has a significant interest in
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens by preventing brewers from competing on
the basis of alcohol strength."); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 536 (1945) (naming public
safety and health as examples of substantial interests).
220 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
221 Id. at 566.
222 Id. at 569-570.
223 Id. at 558-559.
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tral Hudson, which the court found too broad because it applied even to adver-
tising by electric companies that did not increase energy consumption, 224 West
Virginia's law applies too broadly because it reaches all pharmaceutical compa-
nies regardless of how much the company spends on advertising and marketing.
The State may argue in response that § 5A-3C-6 is not an overly broad
ban on advertising because it does not prohibit any companies from spending
money on advertising; rather, it only forces companies to pay for their own
marketing schemes. Thus, it only targets those companies that are spending a
great deal on advertising and inflating their prices in order to pay for the adver-
tisements, not those that employ reasonable advertising campaigns and do not
need to inflate their prices. The restriction does not necessarily forbid market-
ing; it simply refuses to pay for marketing when the state purchases prescription
drugs.
225
Alternatively, the companies may argue that the West Virginia law fails
the fourth prong because there are several less burdensome alternatives avail-
able.226 The companies may point to some of the other programs implemented
by the Act, such as the clearinghouse program227 and the discount card pro-
gram.228 These programs both further the state's goal of lowering drug costs for
residents and neither restricts the companies' freedom to advertise.
The State may respond to the companies' suggested less restrictive al-
ternatives by arguing that these alternatives have already been tried and have
proven to be insufficient to achieve the state's goal. It will draw on the court's
analysis in Thompson, where the court, after listing off several alternatives to
the government's ban on advertising compound drugs, considered whether there
was evidence that all of the alternatives would be insufficient to attain the gov-
ernment's goal.229 In Thompson, the court found that the government failed to
offer any such evidence.23°
In contrast, here the State will be able to supply evidence that these pro-
grams are insufficient. The State may explain that these two programs alone
224 Id. at 570-57 1.
225 See Morgan Kelly, Drug-price Group Meets in City, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Oct. 22, 2005, at
IA. West Virginia House Speaker Bob Kiss has stated:
West Virginia is not against drug companies making a profit .... the state sets
a base price for drugs and will negotiate with firms until a suitable price is
reached .... What we will not pay for is advertising .... [the pharmaceutical
companies] can still spend $10 million on advertising, but we ain't paying for
it anymore.
Id.
n6 See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002). This is clearly the
stronger of PhRMA's potential arguments.
227 W.VA. CODE § 5A-3C-4 (West 2006).
228 Id. § 5A-3C-5.
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will not be sufficient to directly advance the State's interest because both pro-
grams merely extend already existing assistance programs.231 The programs do
not improve upon the currently existing conditions. Furthermore, both pro-
grams reach only a limited sector of the population because only those people
who meet the qualifications for the programs - qualifications that are set by the
pharmaceutical companies - will have access to the more affordable prices.232
The clearinghouse, for example, merely created a central location for
obtaining assistance program information; it did not alleviate the patients' obli-
gations to meet each manufacturer's unique eligibility requirements and fill out
each manufacturer's unique form. 233  Likewise, the discount card program
would add nothing new to the existing conditions. In fact, the addition of an-
other discount card may actually make prescription drugs more difficult to ob-
tain because it would add to the already existing confusion.2 4 Thus these pro-
grams are insufficient to effectively advance the government's interest in de-
creasing the cost of pharmaceuticals and making prescription drugs more avail-
able to the "broadest percentage of the population" of West Virginia.235 Be-
cause these programs are insufficient to achieve its stated interest, the State may
argue that they are not satisfactory alternatives. Unless the companies can pro-
pose a sufficient alternative, the State should prevail on this prong.
The clearinghouse and discount card programs are insufficient to
achieve the State's named interests. The State has clear evidence that the clear-
inghouse has already failed and that the discount card would not be effective.
One part of the Council's duties under the Act includes studying the effects of
these programs. The Council has published several reports explaining the fail-
231 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-4(a) (stating "brand pharmaceutical manufacturers shall create and
implement a program to assist state residents who are low income or uninsured to gain access to
prescription medications through existing private and public sector programs and prescription
drug assistance programs offered by manufacturers.") (emphasis added); id. § 5A-3C-5 (stating
"There is hereby established a discount drug program to provide low-income, uninsured individu-
als with access to prescription drugs from participating brand pharmaceutical companies through.
• . a program that extends current brand pharmaceutical manufacturer prescription drug assis-
tance programs.") (emphasis added).
232 Partnership for Prescription Assistance, httpsi/www.pparx.org/Intro.php (follow the "Pa-
tients Click Here to Start" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
233 W. VA. PHARMACEUTICAL COST MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, CLEARINGHOUSE REPORT 2 (2004),
http:/www.state.wv.us/got/pharmacycouncil/sec/default.cfm (follow "Clearinghouse Report
(from the Discount Subcommittee) to Pharmaceutical Cost Management Council" hyperlink under
the heading "Documents from August 25, 2004 meeting").
234 W. VA. PHARMACEUTICAL COST MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, DISCOUNT SUBCOMMITrEE
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE DISCOUNT CARD 1 (2004), available at
httpJ/www.state.wv.us/got/pharmacycouncil/sec/default.cfm (follow "Discount Subcommittee
Recommendations on the Discount Card" hyperlink under the heading "Documents from Nov. 18,
2004 meeting").
235 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-6(d) (West 2006).
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ure or expected failure of these and other proposed programs.236 Thus Section
5A-3C-6 likely will survive the fourth prong of Central Hudson, and therefore,
it will survive the entire Central Hudson test. Even if the court is not convinced
that the First Amendment does not apply because of the State's permissive dis-
cretion in using its spending power, the Act will nonetheless survive because it
passes all four prongs of the Central Hudson test.
B. The Disclosure Requirement
In addition to the pricing schedule, Section 5A-3C-13, the section that
provides for mandatory disclosure of advertising expenses, may face a First
Amendment challenge. The speech allegedly regulated in this provision is the
companies' disclosure of, or more accurately the companies' desire not to dis-
close, their marketing expenses. The statute requires the companies to provide
detailed information about their marketing expenses to the government, and it
permits the government to turn that information over to the public in aggregate
form.237 The companies likely will argue that this section is unconstitutional
because it discourages them from advertising by essentially compelling them to
disclose to the public information to which the public may negatively respond
by boycotting brand pharmaceuticals. If the companies argue that they are be-
ing forced to speak in a way that actually discourages them from speaking, the
standard for compelled speech is the appropriate standard to apply.
Again, the State may argue that the First Amendment does not even ap-
ply here. The State may argue that the body of case law regarding compelled
speech does not discuss confidential disclosures to the government, but rather it
discusses government requirements that certain information or opinions be made
public.2 38 Thus, the State will distinguish this disclosure requirement from those
struck down by the court. For example, the State may distinguish this disclosure
requirement from the disclosure requirement invalidated in Riley v. National
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.239 In Riley, the court struck
236 See generally W. VA. PHARMACEUTICAL COST MANAGEMENT COUNCIL,
httpJ/www.state.wv.us/got/pharmacycouncil (follow "Presentation Documents" hyperlink) (last
visited Oct. 20, 2006) (listing several documents prepared by the Council and others).
237 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-13 (West 2006).
238 See, e.g., Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996) (involving a gov-
ernment requirement that labels on dairy products disclose whether the product was made using
bovine growth hormones). The distinction between disclosure to the Government and disclosure
to the public is no small distinction. Other regulations involving disclosure to the Government
have been challenged before. However, these regulations have been challenged on due process
and privacy grounds rather than under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that a requirement that facilities that provide abortions
keep and submit records of abortions performed did not violate the due process clause); Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (holding that a public health regulation requiring recordkeeping of all
prescriptions for controlled substances did not violate patients' privacy interests).
239 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
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down a state law that required professional fundraisers to disclose their profits
to potential donors during solicitation calls.24° Here, in contrast, the State is
requiring disclosure to the State, not to the public, for the purpose of the State
studying the relationship between the problem of rising prescription drug costs
and the costs of pharmaceutical advertising. Similar disclosure requirements are
part of many bodies of law in this country including federal tax24' and securities
regulations. 42
The companies may respond that regardless of who the disclosure is
made to, it will discourage speech, and therefore, it invokes the protection of the
First Amendment. An absence of case law applying the First Amendment to
these disclosure requirements does not necessarily mean that the First Amend-
ment does not apply. Furthermore, the companies may remind the court that the
law provides that the State may make this information public in aggregate
form.2 43 Therefore, the companies may argue that the law essentially requires
public disclosure, and in this sense, it is like the law invalidated in Riley.
If the court decides that there is in fact a restriction on the companies'
First Amendment freedoms, it will first need to determine which standard to
apply - intermediate or strict scrutiny. The proper standard is probably inter-
mediate scrutiny; however, the Act is likely to withstand even the strictest de-
gree of scrutiny despite the fact that so few restrictions survive strict scrutiny.
244
To survive strict scrutiny, the State must prove that these two sections are nar-
rowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.
245
The State may argue that it has a compelling interest in the public health
of its residents. This argument likely will persuade the court as it has previously
held in other opinions that public health may be a compelling government inter-
est.246 Next the State will have to prove that its regulation is narrowly tailored
to its interest in public health. The companies likely will argue that like the law
in Riley, West Virginia's law is unduly burdensome.247  In Riley, the court
found that a state law requiring professional fundraisers to disclose their profit
to potential donors was unduly burdensome because it hampered the fundrais-
ers' legitimate efforts to raise money for charity and it discriminated against
240 Id. at 784.
241 26 U.S.C. §§ 6012, 6061 (2000).
242 17 C.F.R. § 210.5-02 (2005).
243 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-13(e) (West 2006).
244 See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-383 (1992).
245 Sable Commc'n v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989).
246 See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995) (stating that "States have a
compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and ... as part of their
power to protect public health, safety, and other valid interests, they have broad power to establish
standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions."); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (finding under the Due Process clause that maternal health was a com-
pelling interest that can be protected by narrowly tailored legislation).
247 Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
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small or unpopular charities. 248 Here, the companies likely will argue that West
Virginia's law is unduly burdensome because it discourages all pharmaceutical
companies from advertising regardless of the cost of the companies' ads and
thereby denies people access to the beneficial information available in these ads.
The companies may explain that advertising is beneficial because (1) it informs
consumers of the availability of new drugs and their benefits and side effects,
(2) it raises public awareness of diseases, and (3) it encourages patients to dia-
logue with their doctors about appropriate treatment. 249 They may argue that
West Virginia's law unduly burdens these beneficial activities from occurring.
The State likely will respond that unlike the law in Riley, West Vir-
ginia's law is not unduly burdensome. The State will argue that these benefits
of pharmaceutical advertising will not be lost entirely because it is unlikely that
a disclosure requirement would cause the whole industry to completely stop
advertising. In other words, the companies' argument that the disclosure re-
quirement will discourage pharmaceutical advertising is purely speculative. The
health care industry is unique in that it does not respond to economic market
signals like most other industries. 250 Bad publicity relating to cost may not af-
fect the pharmaceutical industry as it would other industries because in the
pharmaceutical industry there are not always alternative choices of medicine
and because people rely heavily on the advice of their doctors.25 1 Consumers
generally lack the information they need to make decisions about their health
care (for example the decision of whether to buy the more expensive or less
expensive prescription). 52 Consumers place a considerable amount of trust in
their doctors to make the right decision for them. 253 Therefore, consumers give
up, to a certain extent, their power to speak with their pocketbook about their
disappointment with the industry's waste of money.
Furthermore, the State will be able to support this argument with a sec-
ond argument that its law is narrowly tailored because there are no less-
restrictive alternatives available. The dicta in Riley provides helpful insight to
this conclusion. 254 In Riley, the court held that a law that required professional
fundraisers to disclose financial statistics to potential donors was not narrowly
tailored. However, the court stated in dicta that the Government could instead
publish the fundraisers' financial disclosure forms and that that would be an
248 Id. at 799-800.
249 MARJORE E. POWELL, PHRMA, PHRMA GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON DTC ADVERTISING 2-6
(2005), available at http://www.state.wv.us/got/pharmacycouncil/sec/default.cfin (follow the
"PhRMA Guiding Principles on DTC Advertising" hyperlink under the heading "Documents from
October 20, 2005 Meeting").
250 BARRY R. FuRROw ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 500-502 (5th
ed. 2004).
251 Id. at 500.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 487 U.S. 781, 800.
[Vol. 109
32
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 109, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol109/iss1/8
A TOUGH PILL TO SWALLOW
acceptable, less restrictive means.255 Here, the West Virginia law does not even
go as far as the court suggests it legally might; rather, the West Virginia law
proposes to publish the information only in aggregate form,25 6 so as not to single
out any one pharmaceutical company.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the United States has previously
found that disclosure requirements "trench much more narrowly" on a speaker's
interests than do flat prohibitions on speech. 5 7 In Zauderer v. Office of Disci-
plinary Council of the Supreme Court of Ohio, the court considered a state dis-
ciplinary council's decision to reprimand an attorney who advertised his legal
services as fee-free unless the client recovered, but who failed to disclose in the
advertisement that the client may be liable for litigation costs.2 5 8 The attorney
challenged the council's decision as violative of his freedom of speech. The
court held that the council did not violate the attorney's First Amendment rights
because the council, in compelling full disclosure, did not attempt to "prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force [the attorney] to confess by word or act [his] faith therein."2 59
The court noted that the difference between disclosure requirements and prohi-
bitions on speech are material. 26 In some instances compulsion is just as viola-
tive as a prohibition, but in this case the attorney's interest in concealing this
factual information was minimal because of the value of the information to con-
sumers.
261
As in Zauderer, where the court permitted the State's compulsion of in-
formation because of its value to consumers, here the information requested by
West Virginia is equally valuable to consumers and to the State in its interest in
learning more about the extent of pharmaceutical advertising expenses in West
Virginia. The State's choice to compel disclosure is narrowly tailored to this
interest. Thus, Section 5A-3C-13 will likely survive regardless of whether the
court applies the strictest form of scrutiny under First Amendment law or
whether the court finds that the First Amendment does not even apply.
V. JUST WHAT THE DOCTOR ORDERED
With the rapid rise in the cost of prescription drugs across the United
States, West Virginia is only one of several states searching for the "perfect
prescription" to cure the problem and make prescription drugs more affordable
255 Id.
256 W. VA. CODE § 5A-3C-13(e) (West 2006).
257 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985).
258 Id. at 630-33.
259 Id. at 651 (citing W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
260 Id. at 650.
261 Id. at 651.
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and available to state residents. Some of the states' solutions are new and inno-
vative, such as West Virginia's disclosure requirement,262 while others extend
old heath care cost-reducing programs and make them more efficient, like the
national clearinghouse program run by the Partnership for Prescription Assis-
tance.
As each state adds a new, powerful tool to its legislative scheme,
PhRMA, the industry's main United States lobbying organization, quickly re-
sponds to ensure that the new legislation does not dig too deep into the indus-
try's pocket. This is precisely what will happen when the West Virginia Phar-
maceutical Cost Management Council's disclosure regulation passes the Legis-
lature or when the Council begins to enforce the pricing schedule. When either
of these events occurs, the pharmaceutical companies' likely challenge will in-
clude a First Amendment challenge. This Article is intended to serve as a
roadmap for that litigation.
As explained in the Article, the court will probably apply the commer-
cial and compelled speech doctrines. Under these doctrines and general princi-
ples of First Amendment analysis, the court is likely to conclude (1) that the
pricing schedule is merely an assertion of the State's control over its financial
expenditures and not a provision that infringes on any First Amendment rights,
and (2) that although the disclosure requirement may invoke the First Amend-
ment, it does not violate the pharmaceutical companies' First Amendment right
to remain silent. Thus, the court is likely to conclude that both provisions sur-
vive the industry's First Amendment challenge. If West Virginia's legislation in
fact survives the challenge, along with any other Constitutional attack that the
industry may raise, then West Virginia's law may become a model for legisla-
tive reform across the United States as other states adopt similar provisions to
make prescription drugs more affordable for their state residents.
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